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26 December 1951

## SECTION I

## INTELLIGENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

The task of Foreign Intelligence at the national level is to provide knowledge essential alike for the formulation and the implementation of the foreign policy of the United States. The national interests of the United States are now affected by trends and events everywhere in the world; the intelligence problem is therefore global. On the other hand, the USSR is now the center of opposition to American policy, and the one power menace to American security; thus the need for knowledge of the USSR, the orbit of its domination, and its world wide communist organization transcends all other intelligence requirements.

There is almost no knowledge of the Soviet Union and its orbit which is not at least of some value to the US policy maker. The multifarious policies, plans, and operations in the political, the economic, the military, and the psychological fields require that intelligence provide something akin to encyclopedic knowledge in almost every phase of Soviet and orbit existence.

Intelligence should be ready with or able to provide on short notice detailed information on personalities, geography, politics, economics, and the military establishment. These are subjects which intelligence has dealt with for generations:

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to them, modern life has added a new pair of unparalleled importance - science and technology.

The success of a simple psychological warfare operation no less than of a broad strategic plan may hinge on a bit of complete and accurate information delivered to the proper official of our government on time.

The size and complexity of the intelligence task is commensurate with the size and complexity of the Soviet Union and its orbit - and the urgency of the task is the urgency of today's situation. Knowledge of the Soviet Union and its orbit which is primarily designed to fit the requirements of national policy formation and implementation can be best discussed in three operational categories.

Soviet Capabilities. By this is meant the strength or complex of strengths with which the Soviet Union and its orbit is able to press any policy that it has taken with respect to the outside world or defend against the policy which some other power is implementing to their injury. The capabilities in question rest upon the geographical and geophysical nature of the USSR and its orbit, their populations, and their genius (or want of it) for organizing men and materials into a community of life and strength. The capabilities manifest themselves in the stability, orderliness, and productivity of the society; the authority of the political machine and the obedience it

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commands; the degree of advancement, the strength, and the productivity of the economy; the amount of manpower which is allocated (both directly as men in uniform and indirectly in the production of the tools of force) to the security forces and the military establishment, and the combat effectiveness of the fighting manpower.

Soviet Intentions. By this is meant to what use the Soviet Union intends to put its capabilities. Intentions include not merely the logical end of Soviet foreign policy, e.g., dominion over a world of communist states, but also all the intermediate and tactical ends as well as the tactics and strategy for the attainment of all ends - from the most trivial to the ultimate. From the intelligence point of view this question is one of the most troublesome. Soviet intent can seldom be inferred directly from the development of Soviet capabilities. It is apparently a basic Soviet doctrine to keep capabilities several stages ahead of intentions, thus insuring a number of alternative courses of action in any particular situation.

Soviet Vulnerabilities. By this is meant the obverse of capabilities. Like capabilities, vulnerabilities have a defensive and an offensive guise. A shortage of essential materials and/or technical skill in the production of certain electronic equipment for the interception of hostile aircraft will adversely affect the Soviet Union's air defense capabilities.

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and to that extent constitutes a defensive vulnerability. On the other hand Soviet shipbuilding capabilities being what they are, the Soviet shipbuilding industry might be termed an offensive vulnerability - e.g., something which is a drag on over-all Soviet capabilities for offensive operations throughout the world. Some vulnerabilities such as a sullen mood on the part of Soviet and orbit nationals who have inarticulate complaints against the regime are both defensive and offensive vulnerabilities.

If the policy maker could count on receiving a complete, accurate, and timely answer to all questions he posed himself regarding the capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union, he could formulate and implement the flawless policy.

To provide such answers is the primary function of the National Intelligence System as represented by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The membership of this committee is drawn from the Office of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department of the Army; Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Directorate of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; Office of the Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission; Office of Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Each of the member organizations, with the exception of CIA, has its own department or agency concern with some or all of these categories of knowledge and all of them have a supradepartmental concern to see that the departmental fragments add up to something greater than and slightly different from the sum of the parts: they should add up to the knowledge upon which will rest the security and welfare of the Republic. The Central Intelligence Agency exists largely to see that the fragments do so. This is a task of great difficulty.

Under the Soviet system all undertakings are centrally planned and carried out for a specific purpose. There need be no abiding consistency between means and objectives. Thus a military move may be designed to serve a purely military end or a political end, an economic move may be undertaken for military reasons; a scientific disclosure may be made primarily with a view to its psychological consequences. All evidence of Soviet activity therefore has to be viewed not only within the context in which it takes place, but also in the general context of all concurrent Soviet activity.

Within each of the three operational categories - capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union - there are three areas of significant detail.

1. The knowable and known. Some of this area is known because the Soviet Union wanted it known as, for example, the Kremlin's adoption of the last five year plan; some because its

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nature prohibits concealment such as the character of the Soviet terrain or of the Soviet Government, and some because of painstaking and alert intelligence work. We know the approximate productivity of key industries in the Soviet economy, the approximate size, combat effectiveness, and degree of war readiness of the Soviet military establishment, and, most dramatically, the Soviet Union's possession of the secret of atomic fission. This is the area of intelligence accomplishment.

2. The knowable but unknown. This area is one of facts which the Kremlin has succeeded thus far in concealing from foreign intelligence. It includes all of those things which at this moment exist but about which we have little or no knowledge. They range from the decisions which the Kremlin has taken (let us presume) with respect to precipitating war in 1952, down to the capabilities of early warning radar on the Arctic approaches; from Kremlin policy regarding the collectivization of agriculture in the satellites to the number of tanks which it will assign the Chinese Communists this month. There are two possible ways of discovering the knowable. They may be called the direct approach and the indirect approach.

The Direct Approach to the knowable but unknown. There are several ways in which the direct approach may be made.

1. One may go to an appropriate Soviet official and put a question. Obviously this is seldom, if ever, profitable. The top Soviet command has yet to prove susceptible to defection.

2. One may attempt to breach his communications.

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3. One may use spies.

Espionage directed against specific targets in the Soviet Union must elude the vast counter-espionage organization of the MGB. It must avoid spot checks of the most arbitrary and unexpected sort and seemingly irrational - almost whimsical - arrests, detentions, incarcerations, and deportations. It must allay the suspicion of the bureaucracy, the communist party faithful, and even casual citizens. After thirty-four years of dictatorship, they have perforce to associate the unusual or the surprising with the dangerous. As a result there exists what amounts to a universal counter-intelligence

Further, the curtailment of information from overt sources

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makes difficult the advance pinpointing of those intelligence targets which espionage alone can hope to exploit. In contrast, consider the case of the Soviet agent with knowledge available to him from unclassified US sources. He could plan the exact time, place, and cover to hit the bull's eye of many a US intelligence target of great importance and hit it with relative safety.

4. One may use aerial reconnaissance.

That most of the targets which might be exploited by the air-borne camera, such as atomic installations and new industrial sites, lie deep in the USSR is an effective barrier to the photo-reconnaissance plane. Less deep photo penetrations and electro-magnetic intercept (ferret) missions along the periphery of the USSR and its orbit, if systematized and intensified, would not only much increase the dangers to crews and equipment, they might also magnify the conditions of international tension. From such evidence the Kremlin might well conclude that the US intended to take early aggressive action against the Soviet Union and its orbit, and itself adopt what it considered to be necessary counter-measures.

Given the Soviet Union's suspicions and the elaborate precautions it takes to frustrate our activities, the direct approach is difficult, hazardous, and extremely expensive in money and talent. Nevertheless the National Intelligence System is able to show appreciable yearly gains. These will appear in detail in the later sections of this report.

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The Indirect Approach to the knowable but unknown. No intelligence service has ever been able to discover by the direct method all that was required of it. All intelligence services have been obliged to supplement the information obtained from their direct approach - no matter how seemingly complete - by the findings of an indirect approach. For example, when the precise capacity of an enemy industry could not be discovered by asking its manager, suborning his assistant, or intercepting their privileged communications, intelligence has fallen back upon official and unofficial publications; it has interrogated people who knew the industry; it has filled out and cross checked its own guesses with bits and pieces of information obtained from a hundred different open sources. Through such a process of surveillance over and research into relatively open sources of knowledge, intelligence has been able to make some of its most valuable discoveries.

The less cautious a state is with respect to the publication of information on its military, economic, and political affairs, the less the degree of official or voluntary censorship, the broader the construction which its citizens put upon the "freedom" of the press; the more remunerative is the indirect intelligence approach to its secrets. The more cautious the state, the closer its censorship, the more direct and authoritative its controls, the less remunerative is the indirect approach. This is not to say, however, that the most

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cautious, suspicious, and authoritarian great date of modern times is able to render the indirect approach useless. But a democracy founded on the principle that the state exists merely to safeguard the liberty of its citizens is a relatively easy mark for another state's intelligence operations employing the indirect approach.

A group of scholars at Yale University which worked over unclassified materials of US origin for a total of ninety-nine man-weeks was able to write a report on US armed forces-in-being of astonishing fullness. Ninety-nine thousand man-weeks of work on open Soviet sources could probably not produce the Soviet counterpart of this study.

There is however an area of significant detail regarding the present-day Soviet Union which the Kremlin cannot suppress. This includes in the first instance matters which in the pre-revolutionary days were studied and written about by foreign as well as Russian observers and scholars. A significant part of it contains relatively changeless phenomena such as the terrain, the climate, and the people. Many of the findings are as true today as when written.

In the second instance, the area includes matters which earlier Soviet censors let by. One of the best examples is Volume II of the Soviet Atlas, published in 1939, which is itself a small encyclopedia on the USSR.

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In the third instance, and most importantly, this area includes that very sizable block of information which the Kremlin has to publish in order to keep its regime alive. It must publish the decrees of the Supreme Soviet which deal with complexities of high governmental structure and policy. It must publish plans, decisions, and regulations of lower organs of government which reveal basic information in half a dozen important categories such as the national economic plans, taxes, prices, availability of raw materials and consumer goods, the progress of science and the arts, education, and political indoctrination of youth.

It must publish a good many details on the military establishment: awards to individuals and units often provide significant hints regarding their activities and achievements. The propaganda in popular military publications frequently indicates the relative importance which the Kremlin attaches to particular military developments. Public displays and parades on official occasions show current models of military equipment. Public purges may occasionally reveal weaknesses in the military establishment.

It must publish textbooks and journals for the education and guidance of virtually every element of the population. These publications may not disclose precisely what the Politburo believes on the various subjects - domestic and foreign - with which they deal; but the more authoritative ones,

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especially those designed for the Party elite, probably depict actual beliefs of the Kremlin. Moreover, these publications certainly reflect what the Kremlin is determined to have its subjects believe. In this respect alone they are of major intelligence value.

In terms of the Leninist doctrine of "self-criticism" to which the regime is still wedded, it must make public the "derelictions" of officials in this or the other line of endeavor, and through such criticisms reveal details of social, political and economic life that might otherwise be concealed. Lastly, because popular morale is of paramount importance in a regime offering the consumer so little, it must exhort its people with stories of its accomplishments - the new railroad, the new hydro-electric project, the new internal waterway, the lengthening of rations, the worthiness of the armed forces. In so doing, it broadcasts information which it might otherwise choose to suppress.

US intelligence, which collects within this area of significant detail, can and does amass a very large volume of information. Some small amount of it in the raw state bears directly upon Soviet capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. The bulk of it however must be subjected to a number of refinements, procedures, and techniques before it can serve the uses of the policy maker. These techniques include: (a) argument from historical precedent (you know a good deal about

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an industry or agricultural operation from what was published a decade ago; direct information, though fragmentary, tends to assure you that changes have been slight), (b) argument from analogy (you know that in such and such a situation, the Soviet military reacted in this way; new information suggests a similar situation and a similar reaction. Or better, you know that the laws of nature cannot be contravened even by the Politburo; for example, the electrolytic process which produces sodium hydroxide and chlorine produces them in the same ratio in the USSR as in the US), (c) extrapolation (you know with a fair degree of accuracy that a trend has developed over the past few years; you project this trend into the future), (d) interpolation (you know what a trend looked like in two separated time periods; you project over the gap).

In all of these techniques the common denominator is the speculation. But it is speculation based on a relatively firm foundation and guided in passage by fragmentary data gathered via the direct approach. The result is an approximation or estimate to be sure, but an estimate which may be corrected periodically as new information comes in and refined until its separation from fact is negligible. The knowledge that many Soviet activities - most notably economic activities - are centrally planned to achieve the goals of a small group of men acting collectively imposes comforting limits on the area in which speculation is remunerative - most certainly when

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compared with the activities of the American democracy which reflect the diverse and uncertain wills of 150 million individual citizens.

From these sources of open information and information clandestinely gathered, and refined by the processes described above, the indirect approach is continually filling in the areas of ignorance. Each day it is advancing us objectively to a better approximation of what must be the fact. But the pace is one of worrisome slowness. For whereas the Soviet Union cannot conceal for all time the key facets of its capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities, it can and does make their discovery arduous, time consuming, and expensive. Moreover, there is every reason to suppose that the Kremlin is constantly engaged in shrewd and elaborate measures designed to block the course of speculation and to deceive foreign intelligence agencies. What the national intelligence effort costs the US in highly-skilled man-hours is a fairer measure of the success of Soviet security precautions than the degree of ignorance to which they consign us.

3. The unknowable. This is not an area of factual situations that have existed or exist at this moment. It is an area of conjecture, hypothesis, possibility, and probability because it deals with the future. The question may be fairly put whether indeed such an area of knowledge is the province of intelligence. The answer is "yes". It rests upon this

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proposition: the man who knows most about the fact of the past and who at the same time makes a business of closely following the present is the man who, at least, has the background for making the most reasonable projections into the future.

This is not to say that his projections must always be correct or must always be more correct than those of someone without his knowledge. It is to say that he should have a considerably higher average of correctness than his uninformed competitor. Particularly in his favor is the unlikelihood that he will make projections which are dramatically wide of the mark. If the knowledge which he commands guarantees him anything, it guarantees the correctness of his judgment where the odds are heavily in favor or heavily against a thing's being or happening. His knowledge should be the sure preventative for the panic-stricken guess.

In the cold war against the Soviet Union and its orbit the US can count, within the measure, upon the friendship and assistance of its allies. In varying degrees of accord with these allies, the US endeavors to consolidate on its side the non-allied countries of the non-communist world or at least prevent them from falling or being drawn into the Soviet orbit.

The US intelligence problem in support of policy towards our allies is small but significant. The fact of friendly relations is an earnest of mutual confidence and where such confidence prevails a great amount of the important knowledge

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of their capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities may be had from them for the asking. Further, where there is unanimity of view, as in our official opposition to communism, we may rely in large measure upon their counter-intelligence organizations for information on communist or other enemy agents who may be trying to use their countries as a base of operations against the US.

However the very fact of their sovereignty and its expression in their national and imperial policies forces them to construe certain of their problems as none of our business. It almost inevitably leads also to significant differences between us. Since practically all of their problems have become in one way or another our problems, and since we must have our own home-prepared briefs whenever differences arise with them we must expend upon our principal and most trusted ally an appreciable intelligence effort.

The US intelligence problem with respect to the non-allied countries of the non-communist world is considerably greater. It is that we can expect from them less frankness than we get from our allies, and that we cannot be so sure of their attitude towards the communist elements in their midst. Thus a considerable intelligence effort is necessary to indicate the most economical and effective lines which our policy of pressure and/or suasion should follow and the counter-intelligence problem - notably counter-espionage - is one which we must handle very largely with our own resources.



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Where and how, it may be asked, does intelligence enter the domain of policy, plans, and operations?

The first place is obviously that where in the performance of its surveillance functions intelligence perceives a danger for which no policy exists. Here intelligence raises the warning signal that the small cloud on the horizon may in fact be advance notice of a major storm.

Alerted by the warning of intelligence or its own mechanisms, policy requires, at the stage of formulation, the aid of intelligence. Intelligence may furnish the broad factual background and those facts peculiar to the local situation which no one but the substantive expert has time and talent to discover. As the policy takes shape intelligence may keep the policy-maker constantly abreast of new developments in the situation. And as the policy-maker and the planner begin to consider possible courses of action, intelligence may estimate for them the obstacles to implementation or the probable repercussions to a given course of action. It may estimate the relative apparent advantages of two or more such courses. Once a policy is adopted and developed in a plan, intelligence may have a considerable role in helping the operators with its implementation. What are intelligence's judgments on the relative merits of several instruments of policy taken singly or in combination, on the methods in which

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they may be applied, on timing? Has intelligence any suggestions of its own which have eluded the policy-maker, the planner, the operator?

The last place where intelligence works with policy is where intelligence may be asked for its appraisal of a situation after a policy has been initiated and put into operation. In one sense this is delicate ground, for here intelligence is asked to criticize the implementation of policy and to give its judgment up on the degree of success or failure of the operation. Yet whether asked or not, intelligence in its estimative work must on many occasions do just this thing. An intelligence estimate which finds a deterioration of morale in western Europe, or a worsening of the military situation in Indo-China contains an implicit adverse criticism of present policy just as an estimate which indicated a reduction of peril in Greece contains a favorable comment on the success of the Truman Doctrine.

The foregoing would indicate that intelligence and policy meet at every stage of the policy-making and implementing process. Is there not the danger that so close a proximity to policy will cost intelligence its independence of inquiry and judgment - in short, is there a danger that intelligence will become the advocate of policy? Unquestionably there is this danger; later in this report that matter will be more fully treated with special reference to intelligence estimates.

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of the highest level of importance. Be it said here, that when intelligence loses its sense of mission and becomes the conscious advocate of this or the other policy, intelligence has lost its reason for existence.

This danger is perhaps more widely appreciated than its opposite: the danger of policy being its own intelligence service. But here the danger is as great, the cost equally high. For when policy moves into the realm of intelligence work and produces its own intelligence it runs the grave risk of creating nothing more than special pleading for a case already accepted - and accepted well in advance of a complete tabulation of the relevant facts. In such circumstances policy may not only adopt a course of action in utter darkness, but be confirmed in its decision by what it fancies to be light.

To the extent that intelligence furnishes facts, approximations of facts, informed and dispassionate judgment where no facts exist, to policy-maker, to planner, and to official with operating responsibilities, to that extent is intelligence making good on its only reason for existence. Under CIA leadership, the national intelligence system has its attention focused upon the correct goals. The instances of its failures are more properly to be ascribed to the extraordinary difficulties of the Soviet Union as an intelligence target than to any home-grown derelictions.

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PROBLEM

To determine the scope, length, and responsibility for drafting of a Progress Report on NSC 50 and NSCID's 1-15.

PAGES

1. The last previous report on NSC 50 was submitted by DCI on 23 April 1952, covering the calendar year 1951. While there has been no specific requirement expressed by NSC for a similar report on calendar 1952, it is reasonable to assume that one would be desired.

2. The previous report dealt specifically with NSC 50 by name. It did not mention the NSCID's by name, but did deal broadly with matters falling under them. It was approximately 4 single-spaced pages in length and covered the following general categories of events: (1) organizational changes (carrying out of NSC 50, estimates program, formation of the EIC, etc.); (2) specific CIA programs pursuant to NSC direction (NSC 26/5, 86/1, 66/1, and 10/5; (3) unsolved problems (the relationship between intelligence and planning, security, etc.); (4) progress on covert intelligence collection and its relationship to other operations; (5) a concluding general statement on the capabilities of the intelligence community to answer the ultimate questions for which it was responsible.

3. The responsibility for this report was scattered. The first draft was done by Mr. W. L. Jackson, as DDCI, on the basis of lengthy contributions by all offices. This was re-written and shortened by Mr. Becker, and finally still further drastically shortened by DCI himself with [redacted] assistance.

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4. Since this report, CIA has submitted to NSC a coordinated IAC report on the progress of all intelligence programs, for NSC 135, and has also submitted individual progress reports on NSC 66/1, 86/1, and 123 (adopted in 1952). (State has responsibility under NSC 26/5, while 10/5 was covered by a limited-distribution contribution to the NSC 135 operation.) The NSC secretariat has indicated that it will request a general semi-annual updating of NSC 135, covering the period July-December 1952. In the normal

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course, there should also be progress reports on the individual CIA projects for NSC, spaced according to need; none is now pressing from this standpoint, either because recently submitted (86/1 and 123) or because still in embryo (66/1).

#### DISCUSSION

5. For efficient handling, there should be above all an early determination of length and scope. If the report is to be similar to last year's, there would be no need of lengthy office contrivances, and the paper could be drafted and then sent around to offices for comment and addition. I attach a list of possible topics for such a report. If, on the other hand, it is felt that a longer report is wanted -- along the lines desired by Mr. Jackson last year -- then a more elaborate procedure will be necessary. It should also be ascertained whether the report will stick to CIA and leave the rest of the intelligence community to be covered by the NSC 135 report.

6. Once these are determined, responsibility should be fixed in a single individual or pair of individuals, in my judgment. The obvious candidates are the Reber [redacted] team. [redacted] experience with the last report and her experience with the [redacted] progress reports would make her an almost essential participant. While we don't need to cross this bridge in toto now, it is my strong feeling that the preparation of all NSC reports by CIA should be placed in the hands of the NSC staff team, even to the point of having initial drafts done by them, on the basis of information by -- and with prior clearance from -- the staff office responsible. This would not apply to the NSC 135 job, which involves contact with the IAC agencies on a scale and level appropriate to Mr. Reber's job.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That DCI be asked to indicate the desired length and scope of this report, and to designate DD/I as responsible for its preparation.

(b) That preparation be entrusted to [redacted]

(c) That DCI or DD/I give a preliminary judgment at this time on the attached detailed list of topics that might be covered.

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LIST OF TOPICS FOR NSC 50 PROGRESS REPORT

I. Organizational Changes during 1952.

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- a. Reorganization of the DD/P (under III or IV below.) [REDACTED]
- b. Creation of the semi-overt [REDACTED]
- c. Creation of the DD/1 office and <sup>reorganization of office</sup> [transfer of OO.] [REDACTED]
- d. Progress of estimates program and efforts to serve NSC better and in more timely fashion. (This was mentioned in the last report as one of the unsolved problems.) Also advance programming of estimates. [REDACTED]
- e. Progress of I&B. [REDACTED]
- f. Firming of CENIS ties. [REDACTED]
- g. Creation of SIC. (Include the SIC-5 experience?) [REDACTED]
- h. Brownell Committee and implementation of its report. USCIB status.
- i. Watch Committee and current intelligence activities.
- j. Inauguration of Career Service Program.
- k. Creation of Inspector General.

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II. Specific CIA Programs for NSC. This would cover very briefly 26/5, 86/1, 66/1, 10/5, and 123, chiefly to show their place in CIA activities and to again make the point, <sup>[REDACTED]</sup> <sub>[REDACTED]</sub> that they don't really contribute to the primary intelligence function.

III. Unsolved Problems.

- a. Intelligence and planning. The vulnerability study experience as a case in point. Perhaps specific mention of the need for better liaison with the JCS. Need for continuing improvement in NSC contacts.
- b. Security (whatever still needs saying -- no car complete without one). Query on reference to the [REDACTED] case. [REDACTED]

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- c. The conflict between CIA's intelligence and operational responsibilities. This was in the last report. I doubt if DCI's feelings are any less strong as a result of events of the past few months. Query on specific references.
- d. The Brownell issues and future problems under the solution.
- e. Coordination of external research, for CIA and for the community.

IV. Progress on covert collection activities.

Same as last year.

V. Summary.

Same as last year.

*Other problems:*

*Psychiatric intel support*

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